The Economics of Software Quality Assurance: A Simulation-Based Case Study by Abdel-Hamid, Tarek K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
1988
The Economics of Software Quality Assurance:
A Simulation-Based Case Study
Abdel-Hamid, Tarek K.
JSTOR
Abdel-Hamid, Tarek K. "The economics of software quality assurance: A
simulation-based case study."MIS Quarterly(1988): 395-411.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/68476
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
 Software Quality





 By: Tarek K. Abdel-Hamid
 Department of Administrative
 Sciences
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Monterey, California 93943
 Abstract
 Software quality assurance (QA) is a critical func-
 tion in the successful development and mainte-
 nance of software systems. Because the QA
 activity adds significantly to the cost of develop-
 ing software, the cost-effectiveness of QA has
 been a pressing concern to software quality man-
 agers. As of yet, though, this concern has not
 been adequately addressed in the literature.
 The objective of this article is to investigate the
 tradeoffs between the economic benefits and
 costs of QA. A comprehensive system dynamics
 model of the software development process was
 developed that serves as an experimentation ve-
 hicle for QA policy. One such experiment, involv-
 ing a NASA software project, is discussed in
 detail. In this experiment, the level of QA expendi-
 ture was found to have a significant impact on the
 project's total cost. The model was also used to
 identify the optimal QA expenditure level and its
 distribution throughout the project's lifecycle.
 Keywords: Software quality assurance, software
 project management, software cost,
 system dynamics
 ACM Categories: D.2, D.2.5, D.2.9,1.6,1.6.3
 Introduction
 The IEEE standard P730 defines software quality
 assurance (QA) as "a planned and systematic
 pattern of all actions necessary to provide ade-
 quate confidence that the software conforms to
 established technical requirements" (Buckley
 and Poston, 1984). QA not only holds the key to
 customer satisfaction, but as more and more soft-
 ware managers are starting to realize, it has a di-
 rect impact on the cost and the scheduling of a
 project. "Failure to pay attention to QA has often
 resulted in budget overruns, schedule delays, and
 failure to meet the needs of the customer" (Chow,
 1985).
 The utilization of QA tools and techniques does,
 however, add significantly to the cost of develop-
 ing software. For example, man-hours are
 needed for developing and running test cases and
 conducting structured walkthroughs. These
 added costs are a source of concern to everyone
 associated with the QA program, particularly the
 program manager and the customer.
 A pressing concern to the software quality man-
 ager is how cost efficient are the QA operations
 during the development cycle. The QA organiza-
 tion, just as all elements of the development pro-
 cess, will and should be subject to detailed and
 continuing scrutiny regarding the cost of doing
 business (Knight, 1979).
 Furthermore, QA staffs are continually being chal-
 lenged to translate the cost of quality into dollars
 and cents terms. They are realizing that such
 reinterpretation of quality is essential for gaining
 the involvement and support of top management
 (Riggs, 1983).
 These "pressing concerns" shared by QA man-
 agers and their customers are the focus of this ar-
 ticle. Specifically, the article investigates the
 tradeoffs between the economic benefits and
 costs of the QA effort. Such considerations obvi-
 ously lie at the heart of any QA planning process.
 A Case Study: The DE-A
 Software Project
 Consider the case of a software project conducted
 to develop a software system for a space applica-
 tion. The development and target machines were
 the IBM S/360-95 and -75. The programming lan-
 guage was FORTRAN. The system was esti-
 mated to: be 16,000 delivered source instructions
 (DSI) in size; require 1,100 man-days for develop-
 ment and testing; and be completed in 320 work-
 ing days. How much should management allocate
 toQA?
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 The above project is not a hypothetical scenario.
 Indeed, it is a real project that was conducted at
 the Systems Development Section of NASA's
 Goddard Space Flight Center at Greenbelt, Mary-
 land. The basic requirements for the project were
 to design, implement, and test a software system
 for processing telemetry data and for providing at-
 titude determination and control for the DE-A
 satellite.
 As is typically the case, resources for QA were al-
 located as a function of the project's total develop-
 ment effort. In this case, approximately 30% of the
 DE-A project's development resources were allo-
 cated to QA (e.g., for walkthroughs and re-
 views)-a level that is significantly higher than the
 industry norm (Boehm, 1981).







 380 working days
 Given these statistics, was the QA effort optimal?
 If not, what were the impacts on the project's cost
 and schedule? Such issues are obviously of great
 interest to management. They constitute the pri-
 mary research issues that will be addressed in the
 following sections.
 The Need for an
 Experimentation Vehicle
 In software engineering it is remarkably easy to
 propose hypotheses and remarkably difficult to
 test them. Controlled experiments have proven to
 be too costly and time consuming (Myers, 1976).
 Furthermore, even when affordable, the isolation
 of the effect and the evaluation of the impact of
 any given practice within a large, complex, and
 dynamic project environment can be exceedingly
 difficult (Glass, 1982). Accordingly, it is useful to
 seek other methods for testing software engineer-
 ing hypotheses.
 Simulation modeling provides a viable laboratory
 tool for such a task. In addition to permitting less
 costly and less time-consuming experimentation,
 simulation-type models make "perfectly" con-
 trolled experimentation possible. Indeed:
 The effects of different assumptions and environ-
 mental factors can be tested. In the model sys-
 tem, unlike the real systems, the effect of
 changing one factor can be observed while all
 other factors are held unchanged. Such experi-
 mentation will yield new insights into the charac-
 teristics of the system that the model represents.
 By using a model of a complex system, more can
 be learned about internal interactions than would
 ever be possible through manipulation of the real
 system. Internally, the model provides complete
 control of the system's organizational structure,
 its policies, and its sensitivities to various events
 (Forrester, 1961, p. 55).
 The next section proposes a system dynamics-
 based simulation approach to the study of the
 software development process in general and the
 economics of QA in particular. First, an overview
 of the model's structure is given, next more details
 of the model's QA sector are discussed and the
 validy of the model is tested, and finally the
 model's experimental results pertaining to the
 economics of QA are presented.
 A System Dynamics Model of
 Software Development
 Model structure
 It is important to note that this research work on
 the economics of QA is being conducted within
 the context of a much broader research effort to
 study, gain insight into, and make predictions
 about the dynamics of the entire software devel-
 opment process. A major part of this effort is
 devoted to the development of a comprehensive
 system dynamics computer model of software de-
 velopment. The model is currently being used in
 several research capacities, one of which is to
 serve as a laboratory vehicle for conducting ex-
 perimentation in the area of QA, the topic of this
 article.
 The model was developed on the basis of field in-
 terviews of software project managers in five or-
 ganizations, complemented by an extensive
 database of empirical findings from the literature.
 The model integrates the multiple functions of the
 software development process, including both the
 management-type functions (e.g., planning, con-
 trolling, and staffing) as well as the software pro-
 duction-type activities (e.g., designing, coding,
 reviewing, and testing). Figure 1 depicts an
 overview of the model's four major subsystems:
 (1) the human resource management subsystem;
 (2) the software production subsystem; (3) the
 controlling subsystem; and (4) the planning sub-
 system. Figure 1 also illustrates some of the inter-
 relations among the four subsystems.
 Because the model is quite comprehensive and
 highly detailed, it is infeasible to fully explain it in
 the limited space of this article. Therefore, the de-
 scription is limited to a high-level overview of the
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 Figure 1. Overview of Model Structure
 four subsystems. The model's QA component
 (which is part of the software production sub-
 system) is, however, discussed in more detail in
 a later section. (The interested reader can re-
 fer to Abdel-Hamid, 1984 or Abdel-Hamid and
 Madnick, 1988a; 1988b for a full description of
 the model's structure and its mathematical
 formulation.)
 The human resource management subsystem
 captures the hiring, training, and transfer of the
 human resource. Such actions are not carried out
 in a vacuum, but are affected by the other subsys-
 tems; for example, the hiring rate is a function of
 the work-force level needed to complete the pro-
 ject by a given (planned) date. Similarly, the avail-
 able work force has a direct bearing on the
 allocation of manpower among the different pro-
 duction activities.
 The development lifecycle phases incorporated in
 the software production subsystem include the
 designing, coding, and testing phases. The initial
 requirements definition phase is excluded for two
 reasons: (1) primarily because this study focuses
 on the "endogenous" software development or-
 ganization, i.e., the project managers and the soft-
 ware development professionals, and how their
 policies, decisions, actions, etc. affect the suc-
 cess/failure of software development. In many en-
 vironments the definition of user requirements is
 not totally within the control of the software devel-
 opment group (McGowan and McHenry, 1980);
 (2) "Analysis to determine requirements is distin-
 guished as an activity apart from software devel-
 opment. Technically, the product of analysis is
 non-procedural (i.e., the focus is functional)"
 (McGowan and McHenry, 1980).
 As the software is developed, it is also reviewed,
 using quality assurance activities such as struc-
 tured walkthroughs to detect any errors. Errors
 detected through such activities are reworked.
 However, some "escape" detection until the test-
 ing phase.
 As progress is made, it is reported. A comparison
 of the degree of project progress to the planned
 schedule is captured within the control subsys-
 tem. Once an assessment of the project's status is
 made, it becomes an important input to the plan-
 ning function.
 In the planning subsystem, initial project esti-
 mates are made and then revised, when neces-
 sary, throughout the project's life. For example, to
 handle a project that is behind schedule, plans
 can be revised to (among other things) hire more
 people, extend the schedule, or do both.
 In addition to integrating the managerial and tech-
 nical aspects of software development, the mod-
 eling approach in this study has a second
 important feature that should be noted. The feed-
 back principles of the system dynamics methodol-
 ogy are utilized to structure and clarify the
 complex web of dynamically interacting variables.
 Feedback is the process in which an action taken
 by a person or thing will eventually affect that per-
 son or thing. The significance and applicabilty of
 the feedback systems concept to managerial sys-
 tems has been substantiated by a large number of
 studies (Roberts, 1981). For example, Weick
 (1979) observes that:
 The cause-effect relationships that exist in orga-
 nizations are dense and often circular. Some-
 times these causal circuits cancel the influences
 of one variable on another, and sometimes they
 amplify the effects of one variable on another. It is
 the network of causal relationships that impose
 many of the controls in organizations and that
 stabilize or disrupt the organization. It is the pat-
 terns of these causal links that account for much
 of what happens in organizations. Though not di-
 rectly visible, these causal patterns account for
 more of what happens in organizations than do
 some of the more visible elements such as ma-
 chinery, timeclocks, ... (p. 7).
 It is no wonder, then, that many software man-
 agers get into trouble because they forget to think
 in circles. This is meant literally. Managerial prob-
 lems persist because managers continue to be-
 lieve that there are such things as unilateral
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 causation, independent and dependent variables,
 origins, and terminations.
 Consider, as an example, the feedback loop of
 Figure 2a. It portrays how project work is accom-
 plished through the utilization (1) of project re-
 sources (manpower, facilities, equipment). As (2)
 work is accomplished on the project, it is reported
 (3) through a project control system. Such reports
 cumulate and are processed to create the pro-
 ject's forecast completion time, i.e., adding to the
 current date the indicated time remaining on the
 job. The feedback loop is completed (closed) as
 the difference, if any, between the scheduled
 completion date and the forecast completion date
 causes adjustments in the magnitude or alloca-
 tion of the project's resources (4).
 The feedback loop of Figure 2a provides only a
 very high-level overview of the project control pro-
 cess. At a more detailed level, a far more complex
 conglomerate of interconnected feedback loops
 exists. As an example, consider the feedback loop
 of Figure 2b, which portrays some of the dynamic
 forces directly impacting the QA activity. The loop
 shows how schedule pressures, which arise when
 a software project falls behind schedule, can lead
 to a higher error generation rate. As more errors
 are committed, a larger chunk of the available
 manpower is diverted from development work and
 devoted instead to error correction and rework du-
 ties. As this happens, the project's progress rate
 drops further, leading to even greater schedule
 pressures and necessitating another pass around
 this "vicious cycle."
 However, project managers do have "escape"
 mechanisms to break loose from this positive
 feedback loop. For example, as schedule pres-
 sures persist (e.g., after several passes around
 the loop), project managers can add more people,
 extend the schedule, trim project deliverables,
 etc.
 The details of error generation,
 detection, and correction
 Figure 3 details the model's structure for the gen-
 eration, detection, and correction of errors. This
 component of the model together with two oth-
 ers-software development and system testing-
 constitute the software production subsystem.
 The schematic conventions used in Figure 3 are
 the standard conventions used in system dynam-
 ics models. All the quantities appearing in such
 models can be classified into two broad groups:
 constants (whose values cannot change at all in
 the course of a simulation), and variables (whose





 Model variables are one of three types: level, rate,
 and auxiliary. A level is an accumulation, or an in-
 tegration, over time of flows or changes that come
 into and go out of the level. The flows increasing
 and decreasing a level are called rates. Thus, DE-
 TECTED ERRORS is a level of errors that is in-
 creased by the ERROR DETECTION RATE and
 decreased by the REWORK RATE.
 Rates and levels are shown below:
 LEVEL |
 RATE RATE
 The cloud-like symbols represent sources and
 sinks for the "stuff" that flows into and out of lev-
 els. The flows that are controlled by the rates are
 either information flows or physical flows. The two
 types of arrow designators used are:
 INFORMATION FLOWS --------------..-
 OTHER FLOWS -
 (e.g., People)
 In principle, levels and rates are sufficient to rep-
 resent all variables in a system dynamics model.
 Usually, however, it is very difficult to write a rate
 equation without first doing some (often complex)
 algebraic computations. These additional alge-
 braic computations are termed auxiliaries. Thus,
 auxiliary variables, as their name implies, aid in
 the formulation of rate equations. Auxiliary vari-
 ables are represented by a circular symbol.
 Finally, variables that are defined in sectors of
 the model other than the one(s) diagrammed are
 represented by enclosing the variable name in
 parentheses.
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 PROGRESS RATE + SCHEDULE PRESSURE
 Figure 2. Example Feedback Loops
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 / VARIABLE FROM \
 \ ANOTHER SECTOR/
 Error Generation Factors: Three sets of factors
 affect the error generation rate in a software pro-
 ject. The first set includes organizational factors
 (e.g., the organization's use of structured tech-
 niques (Alberts, 1976), the overall quality of the
 staff (Belford, et al., 1977)). A second set includes
 project-specific factors (e.g., project complexity,
 system size, programming language). Even
 though these two sets of factors differ from organi-
 zation to organization and from one project to an-
 other, they tend to remain constant throughout the
 development lifecycle of any single project. This
 means that in studying the dynamics of software
 quality assurance during the lifecycle of aparticu-
 lar software project (the concern in this study), the
 above variables can be assumed to remain con-
 stant. In the model, such factors are captured
 through the model's nominal error parameters.
 The NOMINAL NUMBER OF ERRORS COM-
 MITTED PER TASK is such a parameter. It cap-
 tures the error generation characteristics of a
 particular project environment, i.e., the software
 product's characteristics as well as those of the
 organization in which it is developed. Thus, its
 value requires modification only when modeling
 different organizational settings or different
 projects, but not while experimenting on a particu-
 lar software project (the scenario in this article). (A
 task is a unit of project work such as a software
 module, a page of documentation, etc. In the
 DE-A project, for example, it is defined as a 40 DSI
 software module.)
 In order to capture the generation of different error
 types, the NOMINAL NUMBER OF ERRORS
 COMMITTED PER TASK is not formulated as a
 scalar, but rather as a continuous function that
 changes in value as the project progresses
 through its lifecycle (i.e., as a function of the % OF
 JOB WORKED). The formulation of the NOMI-
 NAL NUMBER OF ERRORS COMMITTED PER
 TASK serves two purposes. First, its absolute
 value reflects the particular error generation char-
 acteristics of a specific project environment. Sec-
 ond, its shape over the project's lifecycle reflects
 the relative generation rates of different error
 types throughout the life of a project. (As an illus-
 tration, the parameter profile characterizing
 the DE-A software project is presented in the
 Appendix.)
 In addition to the organization- and project-
 specific factors discussed above, a third set of fac-
 tors affecting error generation includes the
 work-force mix and schedule pressures. Unlike
 the factors in the first two sets, these two variables
 cannot be preset for a particular project environ-
 ment. Instead, these factors acquire their values
 dynamically depending on how the project is be-
 ing conducted.
 Consider the impact of work-force mix on error
 generation. The work-force level in the model is
 segregated into two types of employees-newly
 hired and experienced. Newly hired project mem-
 bers typically pass through a project orientation
 period when they are less than fully productive.
 The orientation process educates them through
 training that covers both the social as well as the
 technical environments of the project (Couger and
 Zawacki, 1980). During this training period, newly
 hired employees tend to be more error-prone than
 their experienced counterparts (Endres, 1975;
 Myers, 1976). It is assumed in the model, based
 on the research findings reported in Abdel-Hamid
 (1984), that a newly hired employee is, on the av-
 erage, twice as error-prone as an experienced
 employee.
 The second dynamic variable that can drive error
 generation up is schedule pressure (Mills, 1983;
 Putnam and Fitzsimmons, 1979; Radice, 1982).
 According to DeMarco (1982):
 People under time pressure don't work better,
 they just work faster ... In the struggle to deliver
 any software at all, the first casuality has been
 consideration of the quality of the software
 delivered.
 Two explanations have been proposed in the liter-
 ature to explain why schedule pressures cause
 more errors to be generated. Schneiderman
 (1980) suggests that schedule pressures in-
 crease the "anxiety levels" of programmers. A
 high anxiety level, then
 ...interfaces (with performance), probably by re-
 ducing the size of the short-term memory avail-
 able. When programmers become more anxious
 as deadlines approach, they tend to make even
 more errors ... (Schneiderman, 1980).
 A second explanation is provided by Thibodeau
 and Dodson (1980). They suggest that schedule
 pressures often result in the unintended overlap-
 ping of activities, which, in turn, can significantly
 increase the chance of errors. For example,
 When coding has begun before the completion of
 design, the designers are required to communi-
 cate their results to the programmers in a raw, un-
 qualified state, hence significantly increasing the
 chance of design errors ... This is not to suggest
 that systems cannot be developed with overlap-
 ping activities. Many systems have distinct parts
 that can be coded before the entire design is
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 completed ... We are concerned here with the sit-
 uation where the press of the development
 schedule or the slippage of preceding activities
 results in overlapping activities that would have
 been accomplished better sequentially (Thi-
 bodeau and Dodson, 1980).
 Based on the above, the ERROR GENERATION
 RATE can now be determined. First, a nominal er-
 ror generation rate is computed as the product of
 the NOMINAL NUMBER OF ERRORS COMMIT-
 TED PER TASK and the SOFTWARE DEVELOP-
 MENT RATE (i.e., the number of tasks developed
 per unit of time). Then, the two dynamic factors %
 OF WORK FORCE EXPERIENCED and
 SCHEDULE PRESSURE adjust this nominal rate
 upwards or downwards, depending on the state of
 the project, to arrive at the actual ERROR GEN-
 ERATION RATE.
 The errors generated as the sofware is developed
 remain as POTENTIALLY DETECTABLE ER-
 RORS until the software is reviewed and tested.
 Any detected errors are then reworked. Usually,
 though, some errors will "escape" and pass unde-
 tected into subsequent phases, where detection
 (if any) is at a much higher cost.
 Error Detection Factors: The objective of the
 software quality assurance (QA) activity is to de-
 tect the software errors that have been generated.
 The QA RATE shown in Figure 3 has a rather non-
 characteristic mathematical formulation (with its
 special schematic representation), known as an
 exponential delay. The "characteristic" way is to
 formulate the rate of accomplishing some activity
 as a product of the effort allocated to the activity
 and the productivity at which this effort is utilized.
 However, our field studies indicate that the QA
 rate tends to be independent of the allocated QA
 effort and its productivity!
 In five software-producing organizations studied
 in this research effort, QA effort is planned and al-
 located as a fixed schedule of periodic group-type
 functions. For example, two-hour walkthroughs
 for project members are scheduled once a week.
 During these periodic "QA windows," all tasks de-
 veloped since the previous one are supposed to
 be processed. A surprising finding showed that all
 completed tasks, irrespective of how many there
 were, were always indeed "processed." No back-
 logs, therefore, develop in the QA pipeline even
 when QA activities are suspended temporarily be-
 cause of schedule pressures. For example, when
 walkthroughs are suspended on a project, the re-
 quirement to review the affected tasks is by-
 passed, not postponed. (This behavior was also
 reported by others in the literature, e.g., Hart
 (1982) and Mitchell (1980)).
 Since the objective of the QA activity is to detect
 errors and since undetected errors are by their
 very nature invisible, it is almost impossible to tell
 whether an adequate QA job was done (except
 much later in the lifecycle). Under such circum-
 stances it is easy to rationalize both to oneself and
 to management that the QA job that was "conve-
 nient" to do, was not insufficient.
 Furthermore, the QA effort that is convenient to
 expend (given scheduling considerations) is usu-
 ally never exceeded even when more effort is
 needed. There seem to be no significant incen-
 tives to do otherwise. First, at a psychological
 level, there are actually disincentives for working
 harder at QA, since it only "exposes" more of
 one's mistakes (Weinberg, 1971). Second, at the
 organizational level, there are seldom any real re-
 ward mechanisms in place to promote quality or
 quality-related activities (Cooper and Fisher,
 1979).
 The formulation of the QA RATE as an exponen-
 tial delay provides a good approximation for this
 "Parkinsonian execution" of the QA activity. It
 says that software tasks that are developed will al-
 ways be quality analyzed (or, more accurately,
 considered quality analyzed) after a certain delay,
 which is independent of the actual QA effort
 allocated.
 However, the effectiveness of QA, obviously, de-
 pends on that effort. That is, the amount of errors
 that are detected will necessarily be a function of
 the amount of QA effort allocated. This is evident
 in Figure 3, where the ERROR DETECTION
 RATE equals DAILY MANPOWER FOR QA di-
 vided by QA MANPOWER NEEDED TO DETECT
 AN ERROR.
 As is the case with the ERROR GENERATION
 RATE, the QA MANPOWER NEEDED TO DE-
 TECT AN ERROR is a function of organization-
 type factors such as the overall quality of the staff,
 as well as project-specific factors such as project
 complexity and programming language. As ex-
 plained before, all such factors are assumed to re-
 main constant during the lifecycle of any single
 software project. Such factors are captured in the
 model through the NOMINAL QA MANPOWER
 NEEDED PER ERROR. Because different error
 types differ in how costly they are to detect, this
 nominal parameter is not a scalar. It is a continu-
 ous function that changes as the project pro-
 gresses through its lifecycle. Specifically,
 design-type errors are not only generated at a
 higher rate, as was discussed above, but are also
 more costly to detect than coding-type errors (Al-
 berts, 1976; Boehm, et al., 1975; Myers, 1976).
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 Figure 3. Model Structure for the Generation, Detection, and Correction of Errors
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 The (actual) QA MANPOWER NEEDED TO DE-
 TECT AN ERROR, in addition to being a function
 of error-type, also depends on the efficiency of
 how people work. Man-hours are lost on commu-
 nication and other non-project activities (e.g., per-
 sonal business, coffee breaks, etc.). These types
 of losses are captured in the model's MULTI-
 PLIER TO PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO COMMUNI-
 CATION AND MOTIVATION LOSSES, which
 represents the average productive fraction of a
 man-day. In other words, if the communication
 and motivation losses amount to a 4 man-hour
 loss per day (for the average project member),
 then the value of the multiplier would be 0.5 (as-
 suming an 8-hour work day).
 Finally, there is the effect of error density on the er-
 ror detection activity. At any point in time, the set of
 POTENTIALLY DETECTABLE ERRORS consti-
 tutes a hierarchy of errors, in which some are
 more subtle, and therefore more expensive to de-
 tect than others. Empirical results reported by
 Basili and Weiss (1982) suggest that the distribu-
 tion is pyramid-like, with the majority of errors re-
 quiring a few hours to detect, a few errors
 requiring approximately a day to detect, and still
 fewer errors requiring more than a day to detect.
 The author assumes in the model that as QA activ-
 ities are performed, the more obvious errors will
 be detected first. As they are detected, it becomes
 increasingly expensive to uncover the remaining,
 more elusive (although less pervasive) errors. At
 high error densities (greater than 10 errors/KDSI),
 this factor assumes a neutral role. But as the "ob-
 vious" errors are detected and error density de-
 creases, its impact increases in an exponential
 fashion. For example, when error density de-
 creases to a level as low as 1-2 errors/KDSI, the
 lingering elusive errors are an order of magnitude
 more expensive to detect.
 To recapitulate, the QA MANPOWER NEEDED
 TO DETECT AN ERROR is a function of error-
 type, work efficiency, and error density. Because
 manpower allocations to QA are often modest and
 because some errors are simply too difficult to de-
 tect during the development phase, not all errors
 generated will be detected (Shooman, 1983). In-
 evitably, some errors will escape and pass unde-
 tected into the testing phase (see Figure 3).
 Error Correction Factors: Those errors that are
 detected through QA are reworked. The RE-
 WORK RATE is a function of how much effort is
 allocated to the rework activity (DAILY MAN-
 POWER FOR REWORK), and the ACTUAL RE-
 WORK MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR.
 For example, if the project members commit 10
 man-days per week to rework detected errors,
 and the ACTUAL REWORK MANPOWER
 NEEDED PER ERROR is 1 man-day, then errors
 will be reworked at the rate of 10 per week.
 The ACTUAL REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED
 PER ERROR has two components. The first is the
 NOMINAL REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED
 PER ERROR. As is the case in error detection,
 this nominal component is a function of error-type,
 i.e., design versus coding errors. Design-type er-
 rors are thus generated at a higher rate, are more
 costly to detect, and are more costly to rework (Al-
 berts, 1976; Boehm, et al., 1975; Myers, 1976).
 (See the Appendix.)
 The ACTUAL REWORK MAN-POWER NEEDED
 TO CORRECT AN ERROR also depends on the
 efficiency of the employees. That is, the communi-
 cation and motivation losses need to be ac-
 counted for. For example, if the MULTIPLIER TO
 PRODUCTIVITY DUE TO COMMUNICATION
 AND MOTIVATION LOSSES is 0.5, then the ac-
 tual rework manpower needed to correct an error
 becomes twice the nominal.
 As further demonstrated in Figure 3, the rework-
 ing of software errors is not, itself, an errorless
 activity:
 Human tendency is to consider the 'fix,' or correc-
 tion, to a problem to be error-free itself. Unfortu-
 nately, this is all too frequently untrue in the case
 of fixes to errors found by inspections and by test-
 ing (Fagan, 1976).
 The problem of bad-fixes is widely documented in
 the literature (Endres, 1975; Fagan, 1976; Jones,
 1978; Myers, 1976; Shooman, 1983). Shooman
 and Natarajan (1977) suggest some ways in
 which bad-fixes may be generated:
 1. The correction is based upon faulty analy-
 sis, thus complete bug removal is not
 accomplished.
 2. The corrections of a bug may work locally only
 (i.e., the global aspects of the error still
 remain).
 3. The correction is accomplished, however, it is
 accomplished by the creation of a new error.
 Thus, as detected errors are reworked, some frac-
 tion of the corrections will be bad-fixes. The detec-
 tion and correction of such bad-fixes, together
 with errors that escape QA detection during the
 project's development phases, are activities that
 are captured in the model's system testing sector.
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 Model validation
 The process of judging the validity of a system dy-
 namics model includes a number of objective
 tests (Richardson and Pugh, 1981). They include:
 -Face validity. To test the fit between the rate/
 level/feedback structure of the model and the es-
 sential characteristics of the real system. This fit
 was confirmed by the software project managers
 involved in the study.
 -Replication of reference modes. To test
 whether the model can endogenously reproduce
 the various reference behavior modes character-
 izing the real system. Reference modes repro-
 duced by the model included a diverse set of
 behavior patterns both observed in the organiza-
 tions studied as well as reported in the literature
 (e.g., diminishing returns of QA effort explained
 below).
 -Extreme condition simulations. To test
 whether the model behaves reasonably under ex-
 treme conditions or extreme policies. A model that
 does not behave reasonably under extreme con-
 ditions (e.g., zero error density) is suspect, be-
 cause one may not be certain when aspects of
 extreme conditions may occur in ordinary runs.
 -Case study. The DE-A project case study
 which was conducted after the model was com-
 pletely developed, constituted an important ele-
 ment in validating model behavior. (NASA was not
 one of the five organizations studied during model
 development.)
 Any one of these tests by itself is certainly inade-
 quate as an indicator of model validity. Taken to-
 gether [however], they are a formidable filter
 (Richardson and Pugh, 1981).
 Model experimentation
 Figure 4 depicts the model's simulation of the DE-
 A software project. The model's results con-
 formed quite accurately to the project's actual
 behavior (represented by the O points in the
 Figure).
 The figure shows that project DE-A's manage-
 ment was inclined not to adjust the project's "Esti-
 mated Schedule in Days" during most of the
 development phase of the project. Adjustments in
 the earlier phases of the project were made in-
 stead to the project's work-force level. This be-
 havior is not atypical. It arises, according to
 DeMarco (1982), because of political reasons:
 Once an original estimate is made, it's all too
 tempting to pass up subsequent opportunities to
 estimate by simple sticking with your previous
 numbers. This often happens even when you
 know your old estimates are substantially off.
 There are a few different possible explanations
 forthis effect: It's too early to show slip ... If I re-es-
 timate now, I risk having to do it again later (and
 looking bad twice) .. As you can see, all such rea-
 sons are political in nature.
 The project's work-force pattern, on the other
 hand, does not conform to the typical pattern
 where the work-force level rises, peaks, and then
 drops back to lower levels as the project proceeds
 toward the system testing phase (Boehm, 1981).
 Because NASA's launch of the DE-A satellite was
 tied to the completion of the DE-A software, seri-
 ous schedule slippages were not tolerated.
 Specifically, all software was required to be ac-
 cepted and frozen 90 days before launch. As the
 deadline approached, pressures developed that
 overrode normal work-force stability consider-
 ations. That is, project management became in-
 creasingly willing to "pay any price" necessary to
 avoid overshooting the 90-day-before-launch
 date. Therefore, as Figure 4 indicates, manage-
 ment was increasingly willing to add more people.
 (Abdel-Hamid (1988) investigates whether such a
 staffing policy does or does not contribute to the
 project's late completion.)
 The remaining parts of this section present a se-
 ries of simulation experiments that investigate the
 tradeoffs between the economic costs and bene-
 fits of QA.
 Experiment 1: How Much QA
 Figure 5a plots the model's results of simulating
 the DE-A project using different QA expenditure
 levels. The figure shows the impact of different QA
 expenditure levels (defined as a percentage of to-
 tal man-days) on the project's total cost in man-
 days. The optimal level of QA as a percentage of
 total development man-days is 15%. This result is
 based on the assumption that the QA effort is
 uniformly distributed throughout the project's
 lifecycle.
 Two important conclusions can be drawn from
 Figure 5a. The first, more generalizable conclu-
 sion is that QA policy does have a significant im-
 pact on total project cost. As the figure shows,
 project cost ranges from a low of 1,648 man-days,
 to 5,650 man-days, i.e., a value that is approxi-
 mately 3.5 times higher.
 At low values of QA expenditures, the increase in
 cost results from the high cost of the testing
 phase. On the other hand, at high values of QA ex-
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 Figure 4. Simulation Run of DE-A Project
 penditures, the excessive QA expenditures are
 themselves the culprit. The relationship between
 QA effort and the percentage of errors detected is
 shown in Figure 5b. Notice the "diminishing re-
 turns" of QA exhibited as QA expenditures extend
 beyond 10-15% of development effort. This type
 of behavior has been observed by others in the lit-
 erature (Boehm, 1981; Shooman, 1983).
 The second important conclusion concerns the
 15% value for the optimal QA expenditure level.
 The significance of this result is not its particular
 value, since this cannot be generalized beyond
 the DE-A software project, but rather the process
 of deriving it (using this article's integrative system
 dynamics simulation approach). Beyond con-
 trolled experimentation (which would be too costly
 and time-consuming to be practical), as far as the
 author knows, this model provides the first capa-
 bility to quantitatively analyze the costs/benefits of
 QA policy for software production. It is encourag-
 ing to note that the model can be customized for
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 different software development environments to
 derive environment-specific optimality conditions.
 Experiment 2: Distribution of the QA Effort
 As mentioned above, the optimal level for QA was
 derived under the assumption that QA effort was
 uniformly distributed. This is not necessarily the
 most effectve distribution.
 To identify a more cost-effective distribution, we
 started with the policy of 15% uniformly distributed
 QA effort. Areas in the project's lifecycle where
 such a level is not cost effective were then
 searched out. This was done by conducting simu-
 lation runs to test the impact of negative impulses
 in the QA level (see Figure 6). The effect of such
 an impulse is to decrease QA by 50% (i.e., from
 15% to 7.5%) for a small interval of time. If such an
 impulse leads to a decrease in the project's total
 cost, then this would indicate that a QA level of
 15% is too high at this point in the project's lifecy-
 cle, and vice versa. Figure 7 summarizes the re-
 sults obtained from a series of simulation runs in
 which negative impulses were applied at different
 stages of the lifecycle. The results show that the
 simplistic uniform distribution policy under-
 spends on QA in the early phases of the project
 and over-spends in the middle and final stages.
 By reiterating through the above experimentation
 strategy, the model can be used to derive a more
 cost-effective QA distribution. Such a refined dis-
 tribution (called policy (R) here) is shown in Figure
 8. This figure also shows the 15% uniform QA pol-
 icy as well as the policy that was actually em-
 ployed by NASA on the DE-A project. The impacts














 The cost improvements gained with the refined
 QA policy (R) are achieved largely by overspend-
 ing on QA in the very early stages of the project.
 This allows early detection of design errors which,
 when left undetected, instigate many more errors
 in the later phases.
 As Figure 8 shows, the QA level increases toward
 the end of the project. This proves to be cost effec-
 tive because coding errors are relatively inexpen-
 sive to detect and correct. The QA effort at this
 stage is, therefore, highly productive. Further-
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 more, if left undetected, such coding errors can
 cause additional errors in the system's documen-
 tation and users' manuals, which are typically
 quite expensive to rectify.
 It is important to note that under the three different
 QA policies, the quality of the software product at
 the end of the project is assumed to be the same.
 When using the model, it is assumed that all errors
 not detected during the development stages of the
 project through QA will be detected and corrected
 at the system testing stage. Even though in prac-
 tice some errors often remain in a software
 product after system testing is completed, all such
 errors are excluded from this analysis primarily
 because the generation, detection, and correction
 of such errors are maintenance-type issues that
 are beyond the boundary of this model. Addition-
 ally, errors that escape detection at the system
 testing phase are generally a small fraction of all
 the errors handled at that phase (Deutsch, 1979).
 This assertion may sound surprising to many,
 since it is commonly assumed that the mainte-
 nance activity is costly primarily because of the
 expense incurred in handling such lingering er-
 rors. Empirical results have shown, however, that
 corrections of such errors consume only a small
 portion of the software maintenance activity
 (Lientz and Swanson, 1981). The major portion of
 software maintenance is, instead, devoted to up-
 dating, enhancing, and perfecting the software
 system.
 Summary
 The QA function has, in recent years, become rec-
 ognized as a critical factor in the successful devel-
 opment of software systems. However, because
 the utilization of QA tools and techniques does
 tend to add significantly to the cost of developing
 software, the cost-effectiveness of QA has been a
 significant concern to the software quality man-
 ager. As of yet this concern has not been ade-
 quately addressed in the literature.
 The objective of this article was to investigate the
 tradeoffs between the economic benefits and
 costs of QA. To accomplish this, an integrative
 system dynamics model of the software devlop-
 ment process was developed. The model is com-
 prehensive because it integrates the multiple
 functions of the software development process,
 including both management-type functions and
 software production-type activities. The model
 also captures the dynamics of error generation as
 well as the QA activities of error detection and
 correction.
 An important utility of the model is to serve as a
 laboratory vehicle to conduct controlled experi-
 ments on QA policy. Experimental results re-
 ported in this article show that QA policy has a
 significant impact on project costs. For the
 specific example analyzed, the optimal QA effort
 was 15% of the total development effort. Although
 this particular value applies only to this case-study
 project, the system dynamics-based simulation
 technique used can be adapted to model other
 software project environments.
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 Appendix
 QA Parameter Profile for the DE-A Software Project
 Table equations represent a simple way of expressing relationships, particularly non-linear relations, be-
 tween variables in a system dynamics model. Table equations have the following format:
 Y-variable = TABLE (Table-name, X-variable, L, H, I)
 The above equation indicates a functional relationship between an independent X-variable and a dependent
 Y-variable. L, H, and I describe the low-end L, high-end H, and interval between points in a set of values of the
 independent X-variable. Table-name is the name of an associated table, or set of constant values, of the
 dependent Y-variable that corresponds to each of the values of the X-variable. Thus,
 Y = TABLE (Table-1, X, 0, 5, 1)
 Table-1 = 3/7/9/11/13/14
 would represent the following functional relationship:
 X 0 1 2 3 4 5
 Y 3 7 9 11 13 14
 Such table functions are used, as is shown below, to characterize the QA parameter profile of the DE-A
 project:
 1. NOMINAL NUMBER OF ERRORS COMMITTED PER TASK (NERPK)
 NERPK = TABLE (Table-1, "% OF JOB WORKED", 0, 100, 20)
 Table-1 = 24/22.9/20.75/15.25/13.1/12 ERRORS/KDSI
 2. NOMINAL QA MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (NQAMPE)
 NQAMPE = TABLE (Table-2, "% OF JOB WORKED", 0, 100, 10)
 Table-2 = .4/.4/.39/.375/.35/.3/.25/.225/.21/.2/.2
 Man-Days/ERROR
 3. NOMINAL REWORK MANPOWER NEEDED PER ERROR (NRWMPE)
 NRWMPE = TABLE (Table-3, "% OF JOB WORKED", 0, 100, 20)
 Table-3 = .6/.575/.5/.4/.325/.3 Man-Days/ERROR
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